10月10日,茅台首次就各省区经销商联谊会停止日常运营作出正式回应。市面上不少解读将其定性为“自治组织解散”,但酒业时报梳理公开信息后发现,这个标签只说对了一半。
联谊会的真实身份,是茅台经销商自发组建的自治联络组织——它的“自治”,自治的是自己的会费、会长和日常事务,自治不了茅台的价格体系和渠道政策。
厘清这一点,才能真正读懂这次调整的含义。
联谊会“自治”的是什么
近一个月来,茅台经销商联谊会“解散”“停办”的说法在业内持续发酵。从9月开始,山西、河北、河南、山东、湖南、四川、福建、辽宁、江苏、西藏、吉林等11个省份的联谊会公众号相继完成注销,上海联谊会公众号进入自主注销冻结期,仅贵州仍在更新。
10月10日,贵州茅台酒销售公司正式回应:按照社会组织规范化建设、运行相关要求,目前各省区经销商联谊会、传承人工作部已停止日常工作,但不影响区域市场销售、品牌落地等常规业务的正常推进。
但这里有一个容易被误读的关键问题:联谊会的“自治”,到底自治什么?
公开资料显示,茅台经销商联谊会是由区域内茅台经销商自发组建的自治联络组织,最早一批成立于2010年前后,覆盖全国31个省区。资深茅台经销商赵先生向媒体指出,各省联谊会由经销商自行组建、交会费运营,不属于茅台官方,因无独立法人资质存在民间社团合规风险。
21世纪经济报道的采访进一步印证:茅台经销商联谊会长期以来是各省区市经销商自行联络而形成的组织,并非独立的社会团体法人或经营实体,各省市联谊会的账号不少并无认证,往往由当地联谊会会长单位负责打理。
在酒业时报看来,联谊会的“自治”需要分两个层面来理解。在组织层面,它确实是“自治”的——经销商自己组建、自筹会费、自选会长,湖南联谊会的解散方式就是“经当地经销商表决解散”,而非茅台下发文件撤销。“表决”这个动作本身就说明,联谊会的存续取决于会员经销商的集体意愿,它是一个自愿联合体。
但在治理层面,联谊会不具备任何制度性权力——没有定价权,没有配额分配权,也没有对经销商的惩戒权。它的“自治”是组织形式的自治,不是渠道治理的自治。联谊会自治的是自己的会费怎么花、会长谁来当、公众号谁来运营;它自治不了茅台的价格体系、配额分配和渠道政策——这些权力始终在茅台手中。
更贴近其实际运行状态的描述是:联谊会是茅台经销商在特定历史阶段自发形成的抱团协调平台,其核心作用是负责区内经销商群体内的沟通,并联结区内经销商与贵州茅台酒销售有限公司派驻各地的省区总经理及工作团队。
联谊会当年在做什么
联谊会诞生于2010年前后的渠道扩张期。彼时茅台正处于经销商数量激增的阶段,需要一个平台来协调经销商之间的日常事务。
资深茅台经销商赵先生将联谊会的早年作用概括为四项具体事务:内部协调窜货、沟通配额、稳定区域价格、承接厂家政策传达。这四项全部是执行性和协调性的工作,没有一项涉及对市场规则或渠道体系的独立决策。
2025年7月,茅台曾推动各省联谊会牵头组建联营公司,赋予其飞天茅台价格维稳和本省定制文化茅台开发两大职能,注册资金设定在5000万至1亿元,由参与经销商共同出资。但随后该计划被曝暂缓,有消息称相关方面对此模式存在争议。这进一步说明,联谊会的“能量”来源于经销商的联合出资和集体行动,而非任何制度性的授权。
调整的直接背景
贵州茅台酒销售有限公司在回应中明确表示,本次调整是茅台响应国家关于社会组织规范管理的相关要求,对相关配套运营机制作出的一次系统性梳理与优化。
今年国家先后出台了修订后的《社会团体登记管理条例》《社会组织评比表彰活动管理办法》《社会组织评估管理办法》等多份文件,对社会组织、行业协会、评比表彰活动提出了系统性合规要求。在酒业,今年已有多项评比表彰活动宣布取消或调整,以往颁布的“中国酿酒大师”“中国某酒类特色产区”等称号被陆续撤销。联谊会由经销商自发组建、自筹经费运营,却没有独立法人资质,在现行社会组织管理框架下存在合规风险。茅台官方回应中“响应国家关于社会组织规范管理的相关要求”这一表述,指向的正是这一层逻辑。
此次调整中,传承人工作部的同步停止同样应当放在这一框架下来理解。传承人工作部设在各地经销商联谊会之下,核心使命是帮助经销商下一代完成接班的过渡。它停止运营的直接原因,与联谊会相同——作为依附于联谊会的内设机构,联谊会本身合规状态发生变化,传承人工作部自然同步调整。
事实上,茅台已经在系统性地推进经销商培训体系建设。据新华网报道,茅台将系统开展业务技能、品饮师认证、新媒体运营及“酱二代”传承培养等专项培训,全面提升渠道商专业能力与服务水准。2026年度贵州茅台酒渠道商培训服务机构采购项目也已完成公开招标。经销商代际培养的工作并未停止,只是从联谊会内设机构的组织形式,转为品牌方直接组织的培训体系。
品鉴会经费没有“停”,投放方式在优化
联谊会停止运营引起关注后,市面上出现了“茅台会停止经销商品鉴会经费支持”的说法。对此,茅台的回应十分明确:并未停止对渠道市场活动的支持。
贵州茅台酒销售公司市场工作人员表示,当前消费理念、场景、方式都在发生深刻变化,按照“全面向C”战略部署,茅台品牌推广和市场营销活动会跟随消费端变化优化调整,将通过更加科学、合理的渠道市场支持,与消费场景更好融合适配,为消费者带来更优的服务和体验。
在酒业时报看来,这里的关键词是“优化调整”,而非“取消”。茅台在2026年中报业绩说明会上已明确表态:加大面向终端消费的市场费用投入,取消低于合同价销售的渠道商销售激励政策,同时强化费用审核。这一表态的核心是让每一分市场费用都真正花在消费者身上,而不是经由中间环节分配。
有酒业观察人士分析指出,茅台的策略转向本质是渠道治理持续深化的体现:一方面引导渠道主体合规运营,另一方面优化市场费用投放体系,将资源从投向传统渠道端,转向直接覆盖用户运营、场景建设与消费体验的环节。将市场费用与真实消费场景挂钩,本身也是“全面向C”战略的内在要求。
从终端表现来看,这种投放逻辑的调整已经在落地。有观察者注意到,茅台近期的朋友圈广告投放明显增加,仅个人就刷到了四次茅台广告,分别以飞天茅台酒、马年生肖酒、精品茅台酒、新品四季酒作为封面,这在之前很少见到。这说明茅台正在用更高效、更直接的投放方式替代传统的渠道内部分配模式。
行业渠道变革是正在发生的背景
联谊会停止运营,放在白酒行业渠道变革的大背景下看,并非孤立事件。
中国酒业协会副秘书长刘振国此前表示,2026年白酒行业存量博弈的格局延续,产业态势分化,消费动能偏弱,呈现名酒持续下沉、传统与新型渠道博弈加剧、消费场景加速迭代等行业态势。靠压货、靠渠道、靠规模扩张的白酒时代正在远去,取而代之的是精细化运营与存量博弈。
在这一背景下,头部酒企集体开启了从“渠道管理”向“用户运营”的跃迁。
泸州老窖将2026年定为“数字化应用年”,推进营销全面迈入数字化3.0阶段,用消费数据指导渠道和产品布局,并升级“数字化控盘分利”体系。五粮液将2026年定为“营销守正创新年”,聚焦C端精准运营。洋河将开瓶扫码覆盖整个9月至10月;汾酒将返利和批价稳定、库存健康、开瓶扫码率绑定在一起,靠“五码合一”系统追踪。
在酒业时报看来,头部酒企正在集体完成一次渠道底层逻辑的切换:从“把货压给经销商”到“把酒卖给消费者”。
茅台集团党委副书记、总经理王莉此前在业绩说明会上明确表态:茅台与各类渠道商是各有优势、合作共赢的协同关系,是紧密相连的命运共同体、利益共同体。“直营渠道稳大盘,社会渠道做下沉,两者协同配合”。
陈华此前在2026年茅台酒全国经销商会长联谊会上也强调,i茅台的根本目的是解决触达和效率,摸清真实消费边界。
数据显示,i茅台触达的用户大部分不是原有渠道中的核心客户,而是过去渠道难以覆盖未曾触达的真实消费者。这意味着茅台的数字化渠道是在“做大蛋糕”而非“切分蛋糕”——它为经销商群体打开了增量消费空间。
茅台此次对联谊会及传承人工作部的调整,从官方回应来看,核心逻辑是清晰的:响应社会组织规范化建设要求,对配套运营机制进行系统性梳理与优化,渠道市场支持力度不减,投放方式向消费端适配。
联谊会作为经销商自发组建的自治联络组织,其停止日常运营是社会组织管理新规下的合规化调整。
需要明确的是,这并不意味着经销商群体不能以其他合规形式继续开展联谊与协作——如果经销商有联合的意愿,在合规框架内依然有充分的探索空间。
茅台与经销商之间的新型协作关系,正在“全面向C”战略框架下重新构建。这是一次经销商自发联合体的“合规化调整”,也是一次渠道协作体系的“战略性升级”——它的目标不是削弱经销商,而是让厂商之间的连接更直接、更高效、更贴近消费者。
(本文综合公开行业资讯整理,信息/数据来源:21世纪经济报道、新华网、观点网、深圳商报、微酒、贵州茅台2026年半年报等)
On October 10, Moutai responded officially for the first time to the suspension of daily operations of its provincial and regional dealer associations. Many interpretations in the market have characterised this as the “dissolution of autonomous organisations,” but after reviewing publicly available information, JiuYe Times found that this label is only half correct. The true identity of these associations is that of autonomous liaison organisations voluntarily formed by Moutai distributors — their “autonomy” covers their own membership fees, chairpersons, and daily affairs, but it does not extend to Moutai’s pricing system or channel policies. Clarifying this point is essential to truly understanding the meaning of this adjustment.
What Exactly Is the “Autonomy” of the Associations?
Over the past month, claims of the “dissolution” and “suspension” of Moutai dealer associations have continued to ferment within the industry. Since September, association public accounts in 11 provinces — including Shanxi, Hebei, Henan, Shandong, Hunan, Sichuan, Fujian, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Tibet, and Jilin — have successively completed deregistration, with the Shanghai association’s public account entering a period of voluntary deregistration and freezing, leaving only Guizhou still updating. On October 10, Guizhou Moutai Liquor Sales Company officially responded: in accordance with the requirements for the standardised construction and operation of social organisations, provincial and regional dealer associations and inheritor work departments have currently suspended daily work, but this does not affect the normal progress of routine business such as regional market sales and brand implementation.
But there is a key question here that is easily misinterpreted: what exactly does the “autonomy” of these associations govern?
Public information shows that Moutai dealer associations are autonomous liaison organisations voluntarily formed by Moutai distributors within their regions, with the earliest batch established around 2010, covering 31 provinces nationwide. A veteran Moutai distributor, Mr. Zhao, pointed out to the media that provincial associations are formed by distributors themselves and operated through membership fees, not belonging to Moutai officially, and that due to the lack of independent legal person status, there are compliance risks associated with civil society organisations. Interviews by 21st Century Business Herald further confirmed: Moutai dealer associations have long been organisations formed through voluntary liaison among distributors in each province, and are not independent social organisation legal persons or operating entities. Many of the accounts of provincial and municipal associations are unverified, and are often managed by the chairperson unit of the local association.
In the view of JiuYe Times, the “autonomy” of the associations needs to be understood on two levels. At the organisational level, it is indeed “autonomous” — distributors form it themselves, raise membership fees themselves, and elect their own chairpersons. The dissolution of the Hunan association was carried out “through a vote by local distributors to dissolve,” rather than through a document issued by Moutai to revoke it. The very act of “voting” itself demonstrates that the association’s survival depends on the collective will of member distributors — it is a voluntary union.
But at the governance level, the association does not possess any institutional power — it has no pricing authority, no quota allocation authority, and no disciplinary authority over distributors. Its “autonomy” is autonomy of organisational form, not autonomy of channel governance. The association autonomously decides how its membership fees are spent, who serves as chairperson, and who operates its public account; it cannot autonomously govern Moutai’s pricing system, quota allocation, and channel policies — these powers have always remained in Moutai’s hands.
A more accurate description of its actual operating state is this: the association is a mutual-support coordination platform spontaneously formed by Moutai distributors at a specific historical stage. Its core function is to handle communication within the distributor community in the region and to connect regional distributors with the provincial general managers and working teams dispatched by Guizhou Moutai Liquor Sales Co., Ltd. across various locations.
What Were the Associations Doing Back Then?
The associations were born during the channel expansion period around 2010. At that time, Moutai was in a phase of surging distributor numbers and needed a platform to coordinate daily affairs among distributors. Veteran Moutai distributor Mr. Zhao summarised the associations’ early functions into four specific tasks: internal coordination of cross-region diversion, communication of quotas, stabilisation of regional prices, and transmission of manufacturer policies. All four were executive and coordinative in nature, with none involving independent decision-making on market rules or the channel system.
In July 2025, Moutai promoted provincial associations to lead the formation of joint ventures, granting them two major functions: stabilising Feitian Moutai prices and developing provincial customised cultural Moutai products, with registered capital set at RMB 50 million to RMB 100 million, jointly funded by participating distributors. But the plan was subsequently reported to have been put on hold, with sources saying there were disputes over the model. This further demonstrates that the associations’ “energy” derives from distributors’ joint funding and collective action, rather than any institutional authorisation.
The Direct Background of the Adjustment
Guizhou Moutai Liquor Sales Co., Ltd. made it clear in its response that this adjustment is a systematic review and optimisation of related supporting operating mechanisms by Moutai in response to national requirements regarding the standardised management of social organisations. This year, the state has successively issued multiple documents including the revised “Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organisations,” the “Measures for the Management of Evaluation and Commendation Activities of Social Organisations,” and the “Measures for the Management of Social Organisation Evaluation,” proposing systematic compliance requirements for social organisations, industry associations, and evaluation and commendation activities.
In the liquor industry, multiple evaluation and commendation activities have been announced as cancelled or adjusted this year, with previously conferred titles such as “China Brewing Master” and “China’s Distinctive Liquor Production Region” being successively revoked. The associations, voluntarily formed by distributors and operated with self-raised funds, lack independent legal person status and carry compliance risks under the current social organisation management framework. The phrase in Moutai’s official response — “in response to national requirements regarding the standardised management of social organisations” — points precisely to this logic.
In this adjustment, the simultaneous suspension of the inheritor work departments should also be understood within this framework. The inheritor work departments were established under the dealer associations in various locations, with the core mission of helping the next generation of distributors complete the transition of succession. The direct reason for their suspension is the same as that of the associations — as internal bodies attached to the associations, when the compliance status of the associations themselves changed, the inheritor work departments naturally adjusted in tandem.
In fact, Moutai has already been systematically advancing the construction of a distributor training system. According to Xinhua News Agency, Moutai will systematically carry out specialised training in business skills, taster certification, new media operations, and “sauce second generation” inheritance cultivation, comprehensively enhancing the professional capabilities and service standards of channel partners. The 2026 Guizhou Moutai Liquor channel partner training service organisation procurement project has also completed public bidding. The work of cultivating the next generation of distributors has not stopped — it has simply shifted from the organisational form of an internal body of the associations to a training system directly organised by the brand owner.
Tasting Event Funding Has Not “Stopped” — the Deployment Method Is Being Optimised
After the suspension of the associations’ operations attracted attention, claims appeared in the market that “Moutai will stop funding distributor tasting events.” Moutai’s response to this was very clear: it has not stopped supporting channel market activities. Market staff at Guizhou Moutai Liquor Sales Company stated that current consumption concepts, scenarios, and methods are all undergoing profound changes. In accordance with the “fully C-end oriented” strategic deployment, Moutai’s brand promotion and marketing activities will be optimised and adjusted following changes on the consumer side. Through more scientific and reasonable channel market support, they will better integrate and adapt to consumption scenarios, bringing consumers better services and experiences.
In the view of JiuYe Times, the key word here is “optimisation and adjustment,” not “cancellation.” Moutai made its position clear at its 2026 interim results briefing: increase market expense investment oriented toward terminal consumption, cancel sales incentive policies for channel partners selling below contract prices, and strengthen expense auditing. The core of this statement is to ensure that every cent of market expense is truly spent on consumers, rather than being distributed through intermediate links.
Some liquor industry observers have analysed that the essence of Moutai’s strategic shift is a manifestation of the continued deepening of channel governance: on one hand, guiding channel entities to operate compliantly; on the other hand, optimising the market expense deployment system, shifting resources from traditional channel-end investment to directly covering user operations, scenario building, and consumer experience. Linking market expenses to genuine consumption scenarios is itself an inherent requirement of the “fully C-end oriented” strategy.
From terminal performance, this adjustment in deployment logic is already being implemented. Some observers have noticed that Moutai’s WeChat Moments advertising has increased noticeably recently, with one individual seeing four Moutai advertisements, featuring Feitian Moutai, the Year of the Horse zodiac liquor, Premium Moutai, and the new Four Seasons Liquor as cover images — something rarely seen before. This indicates that Moutai is replacing the traditional internal channel allocation model with more efficient and direct deployment methods.
Industry Channel Transformation Is the Ongoing Background
The suspension of the associations’ operations, viewed against the broader backdrop of channel transformation in the baijiu industry, is not an isolated event. Liu Zhenguo, Deputy Secretary-General of the China Alcoholic Drinks Association, previously stated that in 2026, the stock-market competition pattern in the baijiu industry continues, industry dynamics are diverging, consumer momentum is weak, and the industry is showing trends of continued premium liquor down-tiering, intensified competition between traditional and new channels, and accelerated iteration of consumption scenarios. The era of baijiu relying on inventory loading, channels, and scale expansion is fading, replaced by refined operations and stock-market competition.
Against this backdrop, leading liquor companies have collectively begun a leap from “channel management” to “user operations.” Luzhou Laojiao has designated 2026 as its “Digital Application Year,” advancing marketing comprehensively into the digital 3.0 stage, using consumption data to guide channel and product layout, and upgrading its “digital control-discount and profit-sharing” system. Wuliangye has designated 2026 as its “Marketing Integrity and Innovation Year,” focusing on precise C-end operations. Yanghe has extended bottle-opening QR code scanning across September and October; Fenjiu has linked rebates to price stability, inventory health, and bottle-opening scan rates, tracked through its “five-code integration” system.
In the view of JiuYe Times, leading liquor companies are collectively completing a switch in the underlying logic of channels: from “pushing inventory to distributors” to “selling liquor to consumers.” Wang Li, Deputy Party Secretary and General Manager of Moutai Group, previously stated clearly at a results briefing: Moutai and various channel partners have a collaborative relationship of respective advantages and win-win cooperation, and are a closely connected community of shared destiny and shared interests. “Direct-operated channels stabilise the overall situation, social channels handle down-tiering, and the two work in coordination.”
Chen Hua also emphasised at the 2026 Moutai National Dealer Chairpersons’ Association Meeting that the fundamental purpose of iMoutai is to solve reach and efficiency and to understand the true boundaries of consumption. Data shows that most users reached by iMoutai are not core customers from the original channels, but genuine consumers whom the previous channels could not cover or reach. This means Moutai’s digital channel is “making the cake bigger” rather than “dividing the cake” — it opens up incremental consumption space for the distributor community.
From the official response, the core logic of Moutai’s adjustment to the associations and inheritor work departments is clear: respond to the requirements for standardised construction of social organisations, systematically review and optimise supporting operating mechanisms, maintain channel market support without reduction, and adapt deployment methods toward the consumer end.
As autonomous liaison organisations voluntarily formed by distributors, the suspension of the associations’ daily operations is a compliance adjustment under the new regulations for social organisation management. It should be made clear that this does not mean the distributor community cannot continue to carry out liaison and collaboration in other compliant forms — if distributors have the willingness to unite, there remains ample room for exploration within a compliant framework.
The new collaborative relationship between Moutai and its distributors is being reconstructed under the “fully C-end oriented” strategic framework. This is a “compliance adjustment” of a distributor voluntary union, and also a “strategic upgrade” of the channel collaboration system — its goal is not to weaken distributors, but to make the connection between manufacturer and distributors more direct, more efficient, and closer to consumers.
(This article is compiled from publicly available industry information. Sources/Data: 21st Century Business Herald, Xinhua News Agency, Guandian.com, Shenzhen Economic Daily, Weijiu, Guizhou Moutai 2026 Semi-Annual Report, etc.)
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