8月14日晚，茅台半年报出炉。
数字很多，但《WineTime中文网》扫完这份财报，印象最深的有两个：一个是账上躺着的1848亿现金，半年涨了46%；另一个是i茅台半年卖了403亿，同比翻了近三倍。
这两个数字搁在一起，透露的信号远比“营收923亿、净利445亿”要刺激得多。
1848亿现金，白酒寒冬里的”弹药库”
先说说这1848亿。
什么概念？整个泸州老窖2025年全年营收才257亿，茅台账上的现金能买7个泸州老窖还有找零。放在A股，这笔钱能排进前二十大市值公司。
更夸张的是现金流。上半年经营活动现金流净额707亿，同比暴增439%。
去年上半年茅台现金流才131亿，今年直接飙到700亿级别。
为啥突然这么多现金？茅台自己的解释是财务公司吸收集团存款增加。但《WineTime中文网》觉得，更底层的逻辑是：茅台正在把“收钱”的方式彻底重做一遍。
过去茅台收经销商的预付款，钱先到账，货后发出，现金流自然好看。但今年上半年，合同负债从80亿暴跌到32亿，降幅超过60%。
这意味着经销商不再像以前那样抢着打款囤货了。
按说预收款少了，现金流应该难看。结果呢？现金流反而创了纪录。钱从哪来？i茅台。
i茅台半年403亿，茅台正在”抢回”定价权
i茅台上半年的收入是402.64亿，同比增长274.18%，占了公司总营收的43.63%。
这啥概念？2025年全年i茅台才卖了130亿，今年上半年直接干到403亿，是去年全年的三倍还多。
一个App，半年卖了四百多亿酒。放在消费品行业，这增速比拼多多早期还猛。
更关键的是渠道结构的变化。上半年直销收入520亿，占比57.3%；批发代理387亿，占比跌到42.7%。
批发代理收入同比下降21.58%。
这意味着什么？茅台正在把过去二十年交给经销商的定价权，一点一点收回来。
以前飞天茅台出厂价1169元，终端能炒到两千多，中间差价被经销商和黄牛吃掉。现在i茅台直接卖1639元，经销商合同价也涨到了1369元。
过去那层厚厚的渠道溢价，现在大半进了上市公司的口袋。
招商证券有个观点挺有意思：相比爱马仕那种靠稀缺配货和圈层分配的模式，茅台现在更像苹果——通过官方渠道直连消费者，用数据反哺产品和定价决策。
《WineTime中文网》觉得，这个类比未必完全精准，但方向是对的。苹果直营店占比不到20%，茅台直销已经过半。从”看经销商脸色”到”自己写价格”，茅台的渠道基因正在发生质变。
266家经销商离场，一场迟到的”渠道出清”
直销猛涨的另一面，是经销商体系的剧烈收缩。
上半年国内经销商2307家，新增220家，但同时减少了266家，净减46家。
这是2021年以来经销商收缩幅度最大的一次。
往前翻历史，更有意思。2018年茅台国内经销商还有2987家，2019年砍了610家，2020年又砍了331家。
那两年是茅台渠道改革的“大刀阔斧期”。后来2021年到2025年，经销商数量基本稳住，甚至小幅回升。
今年上半年突然净减46家，信号很明确：新一轮渠道洗牌开始了。
但《WineTime中文网》认为，这不是茅台要”干掉”经销商，而是游戏规则变了。过去经销商靠囤货、炒价赚钱，现在茅台要求”随行就市、量价平衡”，经销商必须从”炒货商”转型为”服务商”。跟不上节奏的，自然被淘汰。
净利十年首降，改革的“学费”贵不贵？
说完亮点，也得看看这份财报的“痛点”。
归母净利润445.17亿，同比下降1.95%。
这是茅台近十年来首次半年报净利润下滑。
利润去哪了？几个因素叠加：
一是系列酒拖了后腿。上半年系列酒收入129.34亿，同比下降6.02%。
茅台1935等产品的渠道库存压力不小，公司主动收缩投放来保价。
二是营业成本涨了21.81%。
销量增加、生产成本上升，再加上直销占比提高（直销成本率高于批发），利润被稀释。
三是价格体系在“让利”。非标产品年初大幅降价回归市场，吨酒价格整体下行。
茅台主动放弃了一部分短期利润，换取价格体系的长期健康。
说白了，利润下降不是需求崩了，而是改革必须交的学费。批价从年初的1640元回升到1710元以上，
终端动销同比环比都在改善。酒还是那瓶酒，只是算账的方式变了。
数科公司：茅台的“数字分身”
8月14日同一天，茅台还发了个公告：把i茅台平台无偿划转给全资子公司”贵州爱茅台数字科技有限公司”，同时转授权使用”MOUTAI”等商标。
这个动作很容易被忽略，但《WineTime中文网》觉得，这可能是这份半年报里最具战略意味的一步。
i茅台不再是上市公司的一个”部门”或”渠道”，而是独立成了一家子公司。这意味着什么？未来i茅台有可能独立融资、独立运营，甚至独立上市。茅台的数字化能力，正在从”工具”升级为”资产”。
想想看，一个拥有9600万注册用户、
半年GMV超400亿的消费品平台，放在互联网赛道值多少钱？虽然茅台未必会走这条路，但把i茅台”装”进独立法人主体，等于给未来的资本运作留了一扇窗。
《WineTime中文网》认为茅台这份半年报，表面看是“营收微增、利润下滑”的平淡叙事，骨子里却是一场渠道权力的重构。
白酒行业正在经历深刻的周期调整。中国酒业协会的报告显示，今年上半年86.7%的白酒企业营业利润在减少，仅有4.9%实现利润增长。
在这样的大环境下，茅台能保持营收正增长、现金流创纪录，已经证明了龙头的抗压能力。
但更值得关注的，是茅台主动选择的“慢”。利润下降、经销商收缩、系列酒调整——这些短期阵痛，换来的是定价权回流、渠道健康、数字化基建。这和2012年行业调整时茅台的被动应对完全不同，这一次，茅台是主动“换挡”。
当然，风险也不是没有。i茅台占比冲到44%，直销占比过半，一旦平台运营出现波动，对整体业绩的冲击会被放大。另外，经销商体系从”蓄水池”变成”服务商”，这个转型能不能顺利完成，还需要时间验证。
中秋国庆旺季马上到来，飞天批价已经站稳1700元。
下半年茅台能不能把“改革的代价”转化为”改革的成果”，市场拭目以待。
On the evening of August 14, Moutai released its semi-annual report. There were plenty of numbers, but after scanning through the report, two figures stood out to WineTime Chinese: RMB 184.8 billion in cash sitting on the balance sheet, up 46% in six months; and iMoutai generating RMB 40.3 billion in half-year sales, nearly quadrupling year-on-year. These two numbers together send a far more telling signal than the headline figures of “RMB 92.3 billion in revenue and RMB 44.5 billion in net profit.”
RMB 184.8 Billion in Cash: The “Arsenal” in the Baijiu Winter
Let’s start with the RMB 184.8 billion. What does that mean? Luzhou Laojiao’s entire 2025 annual revenue was only RMB 25.7 billion – Moutai’s cash balance alone could buy seven Luzhou Laojiaos and still have change. In the A-share market, that sum would rank among the top 20 companies by market capitalisation.
Even more striking is the cash flow. Net operating cash flow in the first half reached RMB 70.7 billion, a staggering 439% year-on-year surge. In the first half of last year, Moutai’s cash flow was only RMB 13.1 billion; this year it shot up to the RMB 70 billion level.
Why the sudden surge in cash? Moutai’s official explanation is that its finance company absorbed increased group deposits. But WineTime Chinese believes the deeper logic is: Moutai is completely restructuring the way it collects payments.
In the past, Moutai collected advance payments from distributors – money came in first, goods were shipped later, and cash flow naturally looked good. But this first half, contract liabilities plummeted from RMB 8 billion to RMB 3.2 billion, a drop of over 60%. This means distributors are no longer rushing to pay in advance and build inventory as they once did. Conventional wisdom would suggest that with fewer advance payments, cash flow should deteriorate. Instead, cash flow hit a record high.
Where did the money come from? iMoutai.
iMoutai: RMB 40.3 Billion in Half a Year, Moutai Is “Reclaiming” Pricing Power
iMoutai’s first-half revenue was RMB 40.264 billion, up 274.18% year-on-year, accounting for 43.63% of the company’s total revenue. For context: in the full year of 2025, iMoutai generated only RMB 13 billion in sales. In just half of 2026, it has already more than tripled last year’s full-year figure. One app, selling over RMB 40 billion worth of liquor in six months. In the consumer goods sector, this growth rate is even more aggressive than Pinduoduo’s early days.
Even more critical is the shift in channel structure. In the first half, direct sales revenue reached RMB 52 billion, accounting for 57.3% of total revenue; wholesale agent revenue was RMB 38.7 billion, falling to 42.7%. Wholesale agent revenue declined 21.58% year-on-year.
What does this mean? Moutai is gradually reclaiming the pricing power it had ceded to distributors over the past two decades. Previously, the ex-factory price of Feitian Moutai was RMB 1,169, while the terminal price could trade above RMB 2,000, with the spread being captured by distributors and scalpers. Now iMoutai sells directly at RMB 1,639, and distributors’ contract price has also risen to RMB 1,369. The thick layer of channel premium that existed in the past is now largely flowing into the listed company’s pocket.
China Merchants Securities offered an interesting perspective: compared to Hermès’s model of relying on scarcity allocation and circle-based distribution, Moutai is now more like Apple – connecting directly with consumers through official channels and using data to inform product and pricing decisions. WineTime Chinese believes this analogy may not be perfectly accurate, but the direction is right. Apple’s direct stores account for less than 20% of its sales; Moutai’s direct sales have already exceeded half. From “reading distributors’ sentiment” to “writing its own prices,” Moutai’s channel DNA is undergoing a fundamental transformation.
266 Distributors Exit: A Belated “Channel Clearing”
On the flip side of surging direct sales is a sharp contraction in the distributor network. In the first half, Moutai had 2,307 domestic distributors, adding 220 new ones but simultaneously losing 266, a net decrease of 46. This is the largest distributor reduction since 2021.
Looking back at history is even more revealing. In 2018, Moutai had 2,987 domestic distributors. In 2019, it cut 610, and in 2020, another 331. Those two years were the “axe-wielding” phase of Moutai’s channel reform. From 2021 to 2025, the number of distributors largely stabilised and even rebounded slightly. The sudden net decrease of 46 in the first half of this year sends a clear signal: a new round of channel consolidation has begun.
But WineTime Chinese believes this does not mean Moutai is trying to “eliminate” distributors – rather, the rules of the game have changed. In the past, distributors profited from hoarding and speculating on prices. Now Moutai requires “market-based pricing and volume-price balance,” forcing distributors to transform from “speculators” to “service providers.” Those who cannot keep up are naturally eliminated.
First Net Profit Decline in a Decade: How Costly Is the Reform Tuition?
After discussing the highlights, we must also examine the “pain points” in this report. Net profit attributable to shareholders was RMB 44.517 billion, down 1.95% year-on-year. This marks Moutai’s first half-year net profit decline in nearly a decade.
Where did the profit go? Several factors converged:
First, series liquor underperformed. Series liquor revenue in the first half was RMB 12.934 billion, down 6.02% year-on-year. Products like Moutai 1935 faced significant channel inventory pressure, so the company proactively reduced supply to protect pricing.
Second, operating costs rose 21.81%. Higher sales volume, increased production costs, and a higher proportion of direct sales (which have a higher cost rate than wholesale) all diluted profit margins.
Third, the pricing system is “taking a haircut” to support the market. Non-standard products saw significant price reductions early in the year to align with market conditions, pulling down the overall average price per tonne. Moutai has voluntarily sacrificed some short-term profit in exchange for long-term pricing health.
In short, the profit decline is not due to collapsing demand – it is the tuition that must be paid for reform. Wholesale prices have rebounded from RMB 1,640 at the start of the year to above RMB 1,710, and terminal sell-through is improving both year-on-year and month-on-month. The liquor is the same – it is just the way the accounts are calculated that has changed.
Digital Technology Company: Moutai’s “Digital Avatar”
On the same day, August 14, Moutai also issued another announcement: it transferred the iMoutai platform free of charge to its wholly-owned subsidiary, “Guizhou Aimoutai Digital Technology Co., Ltd.,” while simultaneously licensing the use of trademarks such as “MOUTAI.”
This move is easy to overlook, but WineTime Chinese believes it may be the most strategically significant step in this semi-annual report. iMoutai is no longer just a “department” or “channel” of the listed company – it has become an independent subsidiary.
What does this mean? In the future, iMoutai could potentially pursue independent financing, independent operations, or even an independent IPO. Moutai’s digital capabilities are evolving from a “tool” into an “asset.”
Consider this: a consumer goods platform with 96 million registered users and over RMB 40 billion in half-year GMV – what would it be worth in the internet sector? While Moutai may not necessarily go down that path, housing iMoutai within an independent legal entity leaves a window open for future capital manoeuvres.
A Channel Power Restructuring in Disguise
WineTime Chinese believes that beneath the surface of “slight revenue growth and profit decline,” this semi-annual report is fundamentally about a restructuring of channel power.
The baijiu industry is undergoing a profound cyclical adjustment. According to a report by the China Alcoholic Drinks Association, 86.7% of baijiu enterprises saw operating profit decline in the first half of this year, with only 4.9% achieving profit growth. In such an environment, Moutai’s ability to maintain positive revenue growth and record cash flow already demonstrates its resilience as the industry leader.
But more noteworthy is the “slowing down” that Moutai has proactively chosen. Profit decline, distributor contraction, series liquor adjustments – these short-term pains are the price paid for regaining pricing power, channel health, and digital infrastructure. This is fundamentally different from Moutai’s passive response during the 2012 industry adjustment. This time, Moutai is proactively “shifting gears.”
Of course, risks remain. With iMoutai accounting for 44% of revenue and direct sales exceeding half, any operational volatility on the platform would have an outsized impact on overall performance. Additionally, the transformation of the distributor system from “reservoir” to “service provider” will take time to verify.
The Mid-Autumn Festival and National Day peak season is approaching, and Feitian wholesale prices have already stabilised above RMB 1,710. Whether Moutai can convert the “cost of reform” into the “fruits of reform” in the second half is something the market will be watching closely.
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