“主动调整”12个月，水井坊怎么了？

一季度辛辛苦苦挣了1.71亿，二季度不仅全吐出来，还倒贴了622万。——水井坊这份半年报，像极了“拆东墙补西墙”的财务修罗场。更让人捏把汗的是，公司账上还压着40.82亿存货，够卖7.6年。所谓的“主动调整”，到底是在刮骨疗毒，还是在温水煮青蛙？

文｜消费志

8月28日晚，水井坊（600779.SH）交出了一份让投资者倒吸凉气的半年成绩单。

上半年营业收入10.82亿元，同比下降27.78%；净利润亏损622.25万元，同比由盈转亏。这是水井坊继2014年上半年之后，时隔12年再次出现半年度亏损。

数字拆开看，更令人心惊。一季度营收8.16亿元，归母净利润1.71亿元。二季度呢？营收只剩2.66亿元，环比暴跌67.4%；归母净利润亏损约1.77亿元。

一季度辛辛苦苦赚的1.71亿元，二季度不仅全部吐回去，还倒贴了600多万。

在消费志看来，这不是简单的季度波动，而是一份用“主动调整”包装起来的经营失控说明书。行业在筑底，水井坊在挖坑。

主动调整的“代价”：3亿营收、2.5亿毛利“人间蒸发”

水井坊对这份成绩单的解释是“主动调整”——推进渠道库存结构优化，主动调整发货节奏。

公司披露，渠道库存较去年同期下降约50%。但代价是：上半年营业收入减少约3亿元，毛利减少约2.5亿元。

换句话说，为了消化渠道库存，水井坊主动“砍掉”了近三成营收。

这让人想起2025年水井坊的操作——全年营收30.38亿元，同比下滑41.77%；归母净利润4.06亿元，同比暴跌69.73%。彼时也是“主动控货去库”的逻辑。

一年半的“主动调整”，营收从2024年的52.17亿元，跌到2025年的30亿级，再跌到2026年上半年勉强过10亿。这条下滑曲线，陡峭得不像“调整”，更像“失速”。

40.82亿存货压顶：去的是渠道库存，涨的是公司仓库

渠道库存下去了，公司自己的存货却上来了。

截至2026年6月末，水井坊存货40.82亿元，较上年末39.11亿元增加1.71亿元，占总资产比重近五成。存货周转天数约2785天，该指标包含大量需要陈化的基酒半成品，不能简单等同于商品销售周期。

渠道库存下降50%固然可喜，但40.82亿的存货压在自家账上，占总资产半壁江山，这哪里是“轻装上阵”？分明是“左兜装右兜”。

白酒行业分析师蔡学飞曾指出，未来1年至2年水井坊将处于“阵痛修复期”。但在消费志看来，阵痛可以理解，可如果“阵痛”变成“慢性病”，市场还有多少耐心？

二季度不只是水井坊的寒冬

当然，水井坊不是一个人在“战斗”。2026年上半年白酒行业的日子普遍不好过。

19家A+H股白酒上市公司上半年合计营收1794亿元，同比减少97亿元，下降5.1%；合计归母净利润674亿元，同比减少95亿元，下降12.3%。14家酒企营收下滑，仅5家实现增长。

次高端阵营是重灾区。泸州老窖上半年营收104.72亿元，同比下降36.35%；净利43.39亿元，同比下降43.37%。洋河股份营收105.40亿元，同比下降28.76%；净利26.02亿元，同比下降40.10%。

券商研报此前已有预判。东方证券在6月29日的报告中，将水井坊2026年归母净利润预测从16.69亿元大幅下调至3.29亿元。方正证券则预计公司2026年营收32.42亿元、归母净利润5.04亿元。以目前半年10.82亿的进度，全年要完成32亿的目标，下半年得做到22亿，难度不小。

行业整体下行是事实，但水井坊27.78%的营收降幅，在19家酒企中也处在明显靠后的位置。

新帅干晓峰的“慢哲学”能救水井坊吗？

6月1日，干晓峰正式接任水井坊总经理。这位54岁的新帅履历光鲜——曾任喜力啤酒东南区销售负责人，后在华润雪花体系内担任多个要职，加入水井坊前任山东景芝白酒总经理。

在6月30日的股东会上，干晓峰提出了自己的经营哲学：坚持长期主义，主动调整经营节奏，以“慢”为“进”，围绕“平衡基础、深化调整、夯实发展”三个方向开展主动管理。他明确表示，不会因为短期市场波动改变长期方向，相对于单纯追求规模增长，更关注经营质量和长期竞争力建设。

从年收入十亿级的景芝到三十亿级的水井坊，规模跃升的另一面是压力同步放大。干晓峰面临的考题，比在景芝时难了不止一个量级。

在消费志看来，“慢哲学”听起来很美，但资本市场的耐心从来不以“哲学”为单位计量。当一季度赚的钱被二季度全部吞噬，当40亿存货压在账上，当人员优化从2025年延续到2026年仍未停歇，投资者想问的是：这个“慢”，要慢到什么时候？

人员动荡未完待续

财报之外，水井坊的人事地震同样值得关注。

2025年，水井坊员工总数从2015人降至1733人，净减282人，一次性辞退补偿金约4400万元。但裁员并未在2025年画上句号。

据蓝鲸新闻报道，2026年水井坊仍在持续收缩人员规模，核心高管层几乎全线更迭——从财务、市场、销售到生产、法务、公关，均有核心岗位发生变动。核心品事业部总经理蒋炜率先离场，随后各条线高管相继调整。

有意思的是，2026年半年报显示，应付职工薪酬期末余额1.47亿元，较上年末增长约15.76%，增量主要来自短期薪酬的正常计提，并未体现大规模新增裁员补偿支出。从财报数据暂时无法推断后续是否会出现更大规模人员优化。

控股股东帝亚吉欧也在同步推进全球重组，启动12亿美元重组计划。母公司“瘦身”，子公司能好过吗？

复苏，还是继续沉沦？

水井坊在财报中表示，随着渠道管理和市场动销能力的持续加强，经营基础将得到夯实。

愿望很美好，现实很骨感。

中国酒类流通协会发布的2026年第二季度中国酒类市场景气指数（ACI）为43.41，低于50的景气分界线，且较一季度的47.32进一步下滑。白酒独立评论员肖竹青表示，目前整个白酒行业总量依旧处在缩量竞争阶段，消费复苏节奏不均衡，宴席、商务场景恢复不及预期。

盛初咨询董事长柴俊则指出，二季度市场呈现“度数越高、景气越低”的特点，终端盈利仍承压，“以价换量”的模式不可持续。

大环境没有转暖的迹象。水井坊能否凭借干晓峰的渠道经验、凭借“主动调整”的成果，在下半年实现业绩反转？

在消费志看来，答案恐怕不那么乐观。二季度2.66亿的营收、1.77亿的亏损，不是一两个季度的“调整”就能翻盘的。当一家公司连续一年半“主动调整”，调整的边界在哪里？当“长期主义”变成业绩下滑的挡箭牌，市场的信任还能支撑多久？

白酒行业已经告别了普涨时代。水井坊要回答的问题很简单：你到底是在主动调整，还是在被行业淘汰的边缘挣扎？

答案，也许在下一份财报里。

“After working hard to earn RMB 171 million in the first quarter, the second quarter not only gave it all back but added another loss of RMB 6.22 million.” – Shuijingfang’s semi-annual report reads like a financial battlefield of “robbing Peter to pay Paul.” Even more concerning is the RMB 4.082 billion in inventory sitting on the company’s books – enough to last 7.6 years of sales. Is this so-called “proactive adjustment” a genuine surgery to the bone, or just boiling the frog slowly?

Text | Xiaofeizhi

On the evening of August 28, Shuijingfang (600779.SH) delivered a half-year report that sent a chill through investors. First-half revenue was RMB 1.082 billion, down 27.78% year-on-year; net loss was RMB 6.2225 million, turning from profit to loss year-on-year. This marks Shuijingfang’s first half-year loss since the first half of 2014 – a gap of 12 years.

Breaking down the numbers reveals an even more alarming picture. Q1 revenue was RMB 816 million, with net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB 171 million. Q2? Revenue dropped to just RMB 266 million, a sequential plunge of 67.4%; net loss attributable to shareholders was approximately RMB 177 million. The RMB 171 million earned in Q1 was not only completely wiped out in Q2 but also required an additional loss of over RMB 6 million.

In the view of Xiaofeizhi, this is not a simple quarterly fluctuation, but a narrative of operational loss of control wrapped in the language of “proactive adjustment.” The industry is bottoming out, but Shuijingfang is digging itself deeper.

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The Cost of “Proactive Adjustment”: RMB 300 Million in Revenue and RMB 250 Million in Gross Profit “Evaporate”

Shuijingfang’s explanation for this performance is “proactive adjustment” – optimising channel inventory structure and proactively adjusting shipment pacing. The company disclosed that channel inventory declined approximately 50% year-on-year. But the cost: first-half revenue decreased by approximately RMB 300 million, and gross profit decreased by approximately RMB 250 million.

In other words, to digest channel inventory, Shuijingfang proactively “cut” nearly 30% of its revenue. This recalls Shuijingfang’s strategy in 2025 – full-year revenue of RMB 3.038 billion, down 41.77% year-on-year; net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB 406 million, plunging 69.73%. The logic was also “proactive supply control and destocking.”

After a year and a half of “proactive adjustment,” revenue has fallen from RMB 5.217 billion in 2024 to the RMB 3 billion level in 2025, and to barely RMB 1 billion in the first half of 2026. This downward curve is so steep that it looks less like “adjustment” and more like “stalling.”

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RMB 4.082 Billion in Inventory Looms Large: Channel Inventory Falls, But Company Warehouses Rise

Channel inventory has come down, but the company’s own inventory has gone up. As of the end of June 2026, Shuijingfang’s inventory stood at RMB 4.082 billion, up RMB 171 million from RMB 3.911 billion at the end of last year, accounting for nearly 50% of total assets. Inventory turnover days stood at approximately 2,785 days – though this metric includes a significant portion of base spirits requiring aging, so it cannot be simply equated to the sales cycle for finished goods.

A 50% reduction in channel inventory is certainly commendable. But RMB 4.082 billion in inventory sitting on the company’s own books, accounting for half of total assets – this is hardly “travelling light.” It’s more like “moving from the left pocket to the right pocket.”

Baijiu industry analyst Cai Xuefei has noted that Shuijingfang will be in a “painful repair period” for the next one to two years. But in the view of Xiaofeizhi, pain is understandable – but if the “pain” becomes a “chronic condition,” how much patience will the market have left?

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Q2 Was Not Shuijingfang’s Winter Alone

Of course, Shuijingfang is not alone in its struggle. The baijiu industry in the first half of 2026 has generally been difficult. The 19 A+H listed baijiu companies recorded combined first-half revenue of RMB 179.4 billion, a decrease of RMB 9.7 billion year-on-year, down 5.1%; combined net profit attributable to shareholders was RMB 67.4 billion, a decrease of RMB 9.5 billion, down 12.3%. Fourteen distillers saw revenue decline, with only five achieving growth.

The sub-premium tier has been hit hardest. Luzhou Laojiao’s first-half revenue was RMB 10.472 billion, down 36.35% year-on-year; net profit of RMB 4.339 billion, down 43.37%. Yanghe Co.’s revenue was RMB 10.540 billion, down 28.76%; net profit of RMB 2.602 billion, down 40.10%.

Brokerage research had already anticipated this. In a report dated June 29, Oriental Securities sharply downgraded its 2026 net profit forecast for Shuijingfang from RMB 1.669 billion to RMB 329 million. Founder Securities projected full-year 2026 revenue of RMB 3.242 billion and net profit of RMB 504 million. Based on the current pace of RMB 1.082 billion in the first half, achieving the full-year target of RMB 3.2 billion would require RMB 2.2 billion in the second half – a significant challenge.

The industry-wide downturn is a fact, but Shuijingfang’s 27.78% revenue decline places it at the lower end of the 19 listed distilleries.

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Can New CEO Gan Xiaofeng’s “Slow Philosophy” Save Shuijingfang?

On June 1, Gan Xiaofeng officially took over as General Manager of Shuijingfang. The 54-year-old new leader brings an impressive resume – former sales head for Heineken’s Southeast China region, followed by key roles within the China Resources Snow Beer system, and most recently General Manager of Shandong Jingzhi Baijiu before joining Shuijingfang.

At the shareholder meeting on June 30, Gan articulated his management philosophy: adhere to long-termism, proactively adjust operational tempo, move forward by “going slow,” and focus on proactive management across three directions – “balancing fundamentals, deepening adjustments, and consolidating development.” He made it clear that he would not change long-term direction due to short-term market fluctuations, and that he prioritises operational quality and long-term competitiveness over simple scale growth.

Moving from Jingzhi with annual revenue of RMB 1 billion to Shuijingfang with RMB 3 billion – the leap in scale is matched by an equally magnified pressure. Gan faces a challenge that is an order of magnitude more difficult than at Jingzhi.

In the view of Xiaofeizhi, the “slow philosophy” sounds beautiful, but capital market patience has never been measured in terms of “philosophy.” When the profits earned in Q1 are entirely consumed in Q2, when RMB 4 billion in inventory sits on the books, and when workforce optimisation continues from 2025 into 2026 without pause – investors want to know: how long will this “slow” last?

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Personnel Turmoil Continues

Beyond the financials, Shuijingfang’s internal upheaval is equally noteworthy. In 2025, Shuijingfang’s total workforce decreased from 2,015 to 1,733, a net reduction of 282, with one-time severance compensation of approximately RMB 44 million. But the layoffs did not conclude in 2025.

According to Blue Whale News, Shuijingfang continued to reduce headcount in 2026, with almost the entire core executive team replaced – from finance, marketing, and sales to production, legal, and public relations, core positions have seen changes. The departure of Jiang Wei, General Manager of the Core Products Business Unit, was the first domino to fall, followed by a series of executive adjustments across all functions.

Interestingly, the 2026 semi-annual report shows that the ending balance of employee compensation payable was RMB 147 million, up approximately 15.76% from the end of last year – mainly reflecting normal accrual of short-term compensation, with no indication of large-scale new severance payouts. It is not possible to infer from the financial data alone whether further large-scale workforce optimisation will follow.

Controlling shareholder Diageo is also advancing a global restructuring, with a US$1.2 billion reorganisation plan in motion. When the parent company is “slimming down,” can the subsidiary fare well?

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Recovery, or Continued Decline?

Shuijingfang stated in its earnings report that with continued strengthening of channel management and market sell-through capabilities, its operational foundation will be consolidated. The aspiration is noble, but reality is harsh.

The China Liquor Circulation Association’s Q2 2026 China Liquor Market Sentiment Index (ACI) stood at 43.41, below the 50 threshold, and further down from 47.32 in Q1. Independent baijiu commentator Xiao Zhuqing noted that the industry is still in a volume-shrinking competition phase, with uneven consumer recovery and banquet and business scenarios recovering slower than expected.

Shengchu Consulting Chairman Chai Jun pointed out that Q2 has seen a pattern of “higher ABV, lower sentiment,” with terminal profitability still under pressure, and the “volume for price” model is unsustainable. The macro environment shows no signs of warming.

Can Shuijingfang leverage Gan Xiaofeng’s channel expertise and the results of its “proactive adjustment” to achieve a performance turnaround in the second half? In the view of Xiaofeizhi, the answer is probably not that optimistic. Q2 revenue of RMB 266 million and a loss of RMB 177 million cannot be turned around in just one or two quarters of “adjustment.”

When a company has been in “proactive adjustment” for a year and a half, where is the boundary of adjustment? When “long-termism” becomes a shield for performance decline, how much longer can market trust hold?

The baijiu industry has already left behind the era of universal growth. The question Shuijingfang must answer is simple: are you truly adjusting proactively, or are you struggling at the edge of being eliminated? The answer may lie in the next earnings report.